intrinsic magnitudes and value

intrinsic features, on one view, are non-relational. so if F is intrinsic to a, then whether a is F does not depend whether a is related to some distinct thing, b or b's features, such that b is non-overlapping with a. magnitudes, on another view, are relational. whether a is F to degree n depends upon a's relation to other things that are F.

these views are incompatible.

if relationalism about magnitudes is true, then there is no such thing as intrinsic value that comes in degrees (on one common way of cashing out intrinsicness).

it's surprising that this incompatibility hasn't received more attention. if i'm correct, the very fate of, for example, consequentialism depends upon a very controversial thesis in metaphysics.

or should we instead say that we simply learned that a controversial thesis in metaphysics is false, and via ethical inquiry?

Risking Lives to Save Lives

This post comes as a result of a conversation I had with my firefighter friend, Kevin (a Certified Badass).

Setup: A two story house catches fire and very soon after the fire department arrives to fight the blaze. The Acting Lieutenant (AL) is the person, let's say, solely responsible for coordinating how the fire will be fought e.g., he or she directs personnel on the ground, determines where to position the fire trucks and equipment, maintains communication with police and medical staff, etc. Finally, a single individual is trapped on the second story and is running out of time.

Suppose AL is a consequentialist, in which case he might reason as follows:

(1) the goodness of saving the trapped victim is an intrinsically valuable state of affairs.

(2) the goodness of having his firefighters go home relatively unscathed is an intrinsically valuable state of affairs.

(3) the conjunction of (1) & (2) is a better SOA than either conjunct obtaining by itself.

(4) the probability of (1) & (2) obtaining is lowered each passing minute.

(5) there is a time T* such that prior to T* the probability of both conjuncts obtaining is greater than .5 but after T* the probability is lower than .5

Of all the possible outcomes prior to T* (3) is what drives AL to make the decisions that he does; after that time, however, he must choose between (1) or (2). While it's possible such that (1) & (2) obtain after T* has passed, AL can only get this consequence if he determines that the goodness of (1) is sufficient to risk the intrinsic value of (2) i.e., the firefighters risk their lives to save the trapped victim. On the other hand, if AL determines that risking the value of (2) is not sufficient given T*, then the intrinsic value of (1) will be lost (along with the conjunction). In other words, the decision procedure AL goes through appears context dependent on T*, plus whether or not he believes risking one SOA is sufficient to save another.

But suppose AL is a Kantian, in which case he might reason as follows:

(1) I have duties to my fellow firefighters and to the trapped victim.

(2) In order to most fully satisfy the categorical imperative (CI), and thus act out of reverence for the moral law so as to instantiate a good will, I must generalize my maxims.

(3) I generalize one maxim to the affect that I don’t use the lives of my firefighters merely as a means to save the trapped victim.

(4) I generalize another maxim to the affect that I don’t use the trapped victim’s circumstances merely as a means to save the lives of my firefighters.

(5) I have a duty to treat both parties as ends-in-themselves (or, as part of the kingdom of ends).

It seems to me that the time indexed properties had in the consequentialist scenario can be applied to the Kantian just as well e.g., “there is a time T*” and so forth. I suggest the difference in the two cases that is morally relevant for our consideration is the following: Con-AL is limited to the amount of intrinsic value he can produce posterior to time T* iff he acts so as to have (2) obtain—in which case the goodness of (1) is lost. He knows that the conjunction of (1) & (2) obtaining is a better SOA than (2) by itself; yet after time T* AL intentionally acts so as to pick a less valuable SOA. Is he allowed to do this? One response: ‘yes’ because if he chooses (1) and things turn ugly, possibly he loses both SOAs—no saving the trapped victim and no firefighters going home unharmed. Call this the ‘negative conjunction’. Surely, (2) obtaining by itself is a better SOA than the negative conjunction. But because Con-AL can’t know the answer to the negative conjunction unless he acts on (1), and since acting on (1) after time T* is possibly worse than acting on (2) alone, Con-AL is rationally compelled to act on (2). Thus, he is limited to the amount of value he can produce.

The Kantian response to the fire scenario, I think, is better and much simpler: K-AL is not limited to the amount of value he can produce insofar as he treats both parties as end-in-themselves, even to that point at which T* has passed provided

(i) going after the victim was initiated out of respect for their life, and (ii) not going after the victim was initiated out of respect for the firefighters’ lives—not because the victim has lost their value. So while it’s true that the victim might lose their life, K-AL’s non-action was never out of disrespect for the victim. Both acts have great moral worth and no value loss.

Thoughts?

-Joseph

Is it Irrational to be Immoral? I think so.

If I fail to do what is moral, am I also failing to heed rationality? Conversely, if I succeed in doing what is moral am I being rational? This pair of questions is hotly contested in moral philosophy. Humeans (inasmuch as they are in line with Hume) say no, and Kantians and Virtue Ethicists say yes. Consequentialists get uneasy when they realize no answer to this question falls out from their theory, but I’ve found that most, when pressed, end up siding with the Humeans.

Here’s a brief argument that that Kantian/Virtue Ethics position is correct (actually two arguments slammed together):


1.) Responding to reasons is rational; failing to respond to reasons is irrational. (Assumption)

2.) You have reasons to behave morally and reasons for not behaving immorally. (Assumption; though I see a case for claiming it is a tautology.)

3.) So, a.) all else equal, inasmuch as you behave morally you are being rational in that regard and b.) all else equal, inasmuch as you fail to behave morally you are being irrational in that regard. (1-2 MP)

Perhaps it could be objected that I’m using reasons so broadly that it becomes trivial. I do not think that is the case; the Humean, it seems to me, is genuinely committed to rejecting my conclusion.

Philosophical Currency

Greetings Friends,

Dan L. and I had a conversation today about a topic I'm calling "philosophical currency". Here is my claim: just as a million Euros can't buy a pack of gum in the US until it's converted into US dollars, so too certain arguments can't purchase intellectual ground until they've been converted into philosophical arguments. I take it that such a claim is uncontroversial. What's of interest to me, I suppose, is to figure out just what that currency amounts to.

To give you an idea of what I have in mind, here's an example: two people are arguing over the moral status of abortion and homosexuality. One of the participants invokes Scripture to prove his case; the other participant invokes the method of reflective equilibrium to prove hers. The debate ends in a stalemate--but not before the one who invoked Scripture realizes that no matter how many biblical verses he dishes out, the other participant won't be moved. She won't be moved, that is, until his arguments are converted into philosophical currency.

No doubt science, theology, history, etc. have their own standards, practices, and in-house debates. I suppose I'm wondering if features like (to borrow from David Boonin) the theoretical virtues, which include parsimony, salience, explanatory scope, inference to the best explanation, together with rigorous logically valid arguments, makes for philosophical currency. The kind of currency of interest to philosophers.

Your thoughts are appreciated.

There Ought to Be More Women

The blog Feminist Philosophers noted this past Sunday that we'll be having "a symposium devoted to a critical examination of [Judith Jarvis] Thomson's famous article ["A Defense of Abortion"]," and that the symposium speakers are "a bunch of dudes discussing what women should be allowed to do with their bodies." They also note, ironically, I think, that the morality of abortion "[m]ust be one of those topics that women just aren't interested in."

I think that it's safe to say that the main claim being made by Feminist Philosophers is

C. There ought to be more women participating in CU's JJT symposium.

I've been trying to formulate an argument for (C), as I'm sure that some plausible argument can be made. However, I'm not positive which of my potential formulations is the formulation the Feminist Philosophers author(s) would find most congenial. I'm hoping that, through this post, we can find a good argument for (C), since (C) strikes me as intuitively plausible. Full disclosure: I haven't read all 67 comments on the original blog post, so I may be restating things that have already been said, or I may be ignorant of proposals given in support of (C).

A Test for the Semantic Contents of Some Aesthetic Judgments

There is certainly a distinction to be made between the following judgments:

1. "x is aesthetically meritorious."
2. "I am aesthetically pleased by x."

But when someone says

3. "x is good,"

what are they expressing? Is it (1) or (2) or some combination of the two or something else entirely?

In this post, I will propose a demarcation criterion, an epistemically accessible test, for determining whether a token of (3) has semantic content similar to a token of (1) or similar to a token of (2). My claim will be that the semantic content of a token of (3) is externalistically determined, but that by demanding internalistic justifications for a tokening of (3), we can determine what that semantic content is.

What Dan's Students Believe

I had about 30 students of mine fill out a survey intended to gauge their real or avowed opinions. Some of the questions (1, 2, 3, 5) are the exact same as a previous survey conducted by Andrew Chapman (posted here). I’m including the results of my survey here, though not in the order in which they were asked on the form. The form itself, in its entirety, is reproduced at the bottom of the post.